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Abstract 
Dehumanization is a useful concept to understand disability, eugenics, and the relationship 
between them.  This chapter provides a broad overview of the history of eugenics and the 
contemporary significance of both that history and eugenics itself with an eye to exploring 
the centrality of disability.  After reprising the history of eugenics up until 1945 and outlining 
the ideas at the core of eugenics, I will focus in the remainder of the chapter on the perhaps 
surprisingly large part of that history that comes after 1945 and why dehumanization remains 
an unfortunately continuing issue for people living under regimes of ableism today across a 
variety of contexts.  Eugenic and newgenic thinking continue to structure the challenges that 
people with disabilities, especially cognitive and psychiatric disabilities, face in a world with 
enhanced capacity for technological intervention in reproductive decision-making. 
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1.  Introduction  
Eugenics and dehumanization are often thought to be closely related because the best-known 
state-sponsored eugenic program—that of the Nazis from 1933 until 1945—involved the 
extreme dehumanization of certain sorts of people, such as Jewish people and people with 
disabilities (Black 2003: ch.15-17; Smith 2001).  Under the Nazi regime, there was the 
systematic segregation, internment, sterilization, and murder of such people as part of an 
explicit program of genocide and extermination of Jewish people and people with disabilities 
(amongst others), who were subject to such treatment because they were deemed to be sorts 
of people who were less than fully human and, in some cases, had “lives without value” or 
“lives not worth living” (Binding and Hoche 1920; Proctor 1988; Taylor 2015).  They were not 
merely viewed as different from those that the Nazis envisaged as populating the Third Reich, 
but were depicted as inferior sorts of people, as Untermenschen (subhumans) or as a 
Gegenrasse (counter-race) who lacked the desired characteristics and abilities to stock future 
generations (Stone 2010, Histories of the Holocaust).  Thus, we find the standard tropes of 
dehumanization—assimilating Jews to vermin and social diseases, comparing disabled people 
to burdensome animals—in Nazi propaganda and in public forms of state communication.   
These dehumanizing depictions were sufficiently extreme in nature that the Nazi state 
apparatus, with the support of the German volk, could see itself justified not simply in 
protecting the German nation from the concocted threats posed by such sorts of people, but 
as dutifully eliminating them from present and future generations altogether.  In the name of 
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eugenics, between 70 000 – 100 000 German citizens with disabilities (Weindling 2014) were 
systematically murdered by the Nazis through the Aktion T4 euthanasia program early in the 
Second World War; approximately 6 000 000 Jews were murdered during the more 
temporally and geographically expansive genocidal Holocaust that was the culmination of the 
Nazi enthusiasm for “racial hygiene” or eugenics. 
Recognition of the dehumanizing nature of these genocidal and murderous laws and 
policies is often thought to have been important in the ending of what I have called the “short 
history” of eugenics (Wilson 2018a: ch.2), being a history that runs for the 80 years between 
Galton’s early thoughts about eugenics in 1865 and the end of the Second World War in 1945.  
But what about eugenics itself?  Is there something about the very idea of eugenics itself that 
is dehumanizing, or instead should we properly reserve that judgment about eugenics for 
extreme implementations of eugenics, such as one finds in Nazi laws and policies?   
Addressing this question will involve shifting from contexts of mass violence to those 
in which dehumanization operates in more subtle ways (High 2015).  The question is neither 
rhetorical nor merely what is sometimes called (disparagingly) a “matter of academic 
interest”, for two reasons.   
First, contemporary philosophers and bioethicist have explored forms of eugenics in a 
more favourable light under the headings of utopian eugenics (Kitcher 2000), liberal eugenics 
(Agar 2004), and moderate eugenics (Selgelid 2014), tying their discussions fairly directly to 
social policies, parental obligations, and norms governing our thinking about biotechnological 
advances, such as those concerning “procreative beneficence” (Savulescu and Kahane 2001; 
Savulescu 2001; Savulescu 2008).  These explorations might be seen as aiming to sift the 
worthy wheat at the core of eugenics from the dehumanizing chaff that is mixed together 
with it as a result of the association of eugenics with what we might think of as its Nazification.  
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As Selgelid says circumspectly, “The fact that the previous practice of eugenics was bad does 
not imply that eugenics, per se, is necessarily an altogether bad thing or that a better future 
eugenics would not be possible” (Selgelid 2014: 6).   
Second, from the standpoint of many people with disabilities, eugenics does not feel 
that distant from their lived experience (Garland-Thomson 2012; Kafer 2013; Wilson 2018b).  
As a note of inferential caution, Selgelid’s point about “eugenics, per se” is well-taken, though 
I would issue my own note of inferential caution about signaling the possibility of a “better 
future eugenics”.  Whether or not Selgelid means here to convey a more enthusiastic view of 
a possible eugenic future, from the perspective of those with disabilities, especially disabilities 
that were the focus of past eugenic policies, practices, and laws, such signaling functions as a 
red flag.   Since eugenics seems to them very much a project aimed at eliminating people like 
them, identifying a possible “better future eugenics” simply exemplifies the eugenic logic 
(Garland-Thomson 2012) that they are all too familiar with.   
Be that as it may, to address the question of whether eugenics in and of itself is 
dehumanizing, one needs to understand both the context in which Nazi eugenics developed 
and the general ideas at the heart of eugenics.  First, consider the context.   
 
2.  Eugenics: Heart and History  
Eugenics made its legislative appearance in Germany during the first six months of the Nazi 
regime’s rule in July 1933 in the form of a sterilization law, a law modelled in part on a Prussian 
law drafted in the previous year.  It mandated sterilization for people with a variety of traits, 
including those who were thought to have hereditary forms of schizophrenia, blindness, and 
deafness, chronic alcoholics, epileptics, those with Huntington’s chorea, and “mental 
defectives”.  This sterilization law was further extended later in 1933 to allow for the 
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castration of criminals and homosexuals, and was used as the basis for sterilizing “mixed race” 
children from 1935, although the law did not strictly allow for their sterilization (Weindling 
2014).   
The interwar beginnings of Nazi eugenics were located in an international milieu in 
which eugenic ideas, practices, policies, and laws were commonplace.  For example, by the 
early 1930s, more than thirty North American state or provincial jurisdictions had passed 
eugenic sterilization laws, typically multiple times as these laws were modified or amended, 
often in order to avoid legal challenges based in the violation of constitutional rights.  In 
Europe, Denmark passed a eugenic sterilization law in 1929, and the other Scandinavian 
countries—Norway, Sweden, and Finland—followed suit in 1934 and 1935 (Broberg and Roll-
Hansen 1996).  The Nazis passed their first eugenic sterilization law in 1934 not only in an 
accepting international political context (Paul 1995: ch.5; Proctor 1988: ch.4)), but also 
against the background of a supportive scientific community; large International Eugenics 
Congresses were held in London in 1912, and in New York in 1921 and 1932 Kühl 2013).  
Moreover, as Allan Chase (1977), Stephan Kühl (1994), and Edwin Black (2003) have each 
argued, the Nazis viewed themselves in the early 1930s as extending what was commonly 
practiced in North America and even based their sterilization legislation on Harry Laughlin’s 
“model sterilization law”, developed over the preceding decade at the Eugenics Records 
Office in Cold Spring Harbor in New York. 
Although the international reach of eugenic ideas was vast, not all countries in which 
those ideas had significant support enacted eugenic laws.  For example, despite being home 
to active eugenics societies with prominent supporters and spokespersons, neither Great 
Britain nor Australia passed eugenic sterilization laws.  In countries such as Portugal, Spain, 
and Brazil, eugenics was cast racially but did not lead to substantial sterilization or 
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immigration laws anchored in eugenic ideas.  In Asia, eugenic thinking was implemented in 
laws and social policies typically after 1945, often being associated with policies of population 
growth control, as was the case in China and in India (Connolly 2008; Kühl  2013). 
Eugenics itself began three generations earlier as a progressive-sounding, meliorative 
project of intergenerational, human improvement.  It was articulated as such a project by the 
polymath Francis Galton in the last third of the nineteenth century, starting with a pair of 
articles in the popular British magazine, Macmillans, in 1865 (Galton 1865).  Galton’s eugenics 
arose within a broader context in which evolutionary thinking had been adapted to social 
transformation and change, with forms of artificial selection having been moved to centred 
stage in Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection.  Darwin’s classic “one long argument” 
for natural selection begins, after all, with an extended analogy between the power of 
artificial selection, directed by human agency and applied to farming animal stocks and plant 
species, and the idea of selection without such direction, natural selection.  Although this 
analogy and focus on human improvement can create the impression that early eugenic 
thought was chiefly directed at what later would be called positive eugenics—the selection 
of desirable traits to be passed down to future generations—the development of eugenics in 
North America around the so-called eugenic family studies (Rafter 1988; Wilson 2014a) with 
their focus on “degenerate” families should remind us that negative eugenics was an integral 
part of eugenic thinking from that outset. 
Consider two general ideas at the heart of eugenics brought forcefully together by 
Galton that go beyond the bare-bones idea that eugenics is a project of human improvement.  
These are the idea that human reproductive value is unevenly distributed both within and 
across human populations, and the idea that we can harness the insights of science and 
technology to direct the constitution of human populations over generational time.  As Galton 
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said in defining the term “eugenics” in 1883, eugenics is “[t]he science of improving stock, not 
only by judicious mating, but whatever tends to give the more suitable races or strains of 
blood a better chance of prevailing over the less suitable than they otherwise would have 
had” (Galton 1883: 25n).  What the science of eugenics was to do was to provide the means 
both to distinguish those of higher quality reproductive value from those of lower quality 
reproductive value, and to guide, constrain, and even shape human populations to promote 
higher quality people in future generations.   
 
3.  Eugenic Traits and Reproductive Value   
To say that human reproductive potential is unevenly distributed within and across human 
populations is a euphemistic way of expressing the idea that some people have traits that 
make them more valuable as hereditary contributors to future generations, and other people 
have traits that make them less valuable in this respect.  That is because the traits themselves 
have differential value to human society and are assumed to be heritable.   
Such traits are what I have elsewhere (Wilson 2014b) called eugenic traits: traits that 
are the basis for differentially treating people thought to have them via eugenic ideas, 
policies, laws, and practices.  Eugenic traits include both valued traits, such as high 
intelligence, and devalued traits, such as intellectual disability.  Historically, the most common 
eugenic traits that served as the basis for the eugenic practice of eugenic sterilization in at 
least North America were feeblemindedness, mental deficiency, epilepsy, and relatively 
indeterminate forms of mental illness, such as insanity (Wilson 2018a: ch.3; see also Reilly 
2015 and Kaelber n.d.).  Here many eugenic traits are disabilities. 
As indicated both by the exemplary and the historically predominant eugenic traits for 
sterilization, intellectual abilities and psychiatric tendencies loom large when eugenic 
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evaluations are made.  There are, however, contexts in which race and ethnicity and their 
proxies, such as country of origin or geographical ancestry, have functioned as eugenic traits, 
such as when they have been the basis for eugenic immigration policies. Consider the 1924 
Johnson-Reid Immigration Act in the United States, which tightened existing quotas for the 
number of immigrants from certain countries or geographical regions, or the so-called “White 
Australia Policy”, beginning with Australia’s original immigration restriction act in 1901, which 
included a 50-word dictation test that could be conducted in any European language and that 
few people of non-European ancestry passed.  In both cases, people of certain colours and 
ethnicities were excluded as potential immigrants to the United States and Australia because 
they were viewed as less suitable “races” to stock these growing nations (Stern 2005; Baynton 
2016). 
So eugenic traits are used to distinguish those perceived as having more valuable 
reproductive potential from those with less.  Eugenic traits also serve as the basis for social 
policies, such as sexual sterilization and immigration restriction acts, that directly influence 
the composition of future generations.  Science and technology can inform social decisions 
here, such as by developing ways to measure intelligence (e.g., IQ tests) or to quantify 
ancestry (e.g., genetic tests).  Science and technology also contribute to providing the means 
through which the reproduction of some is curtailed (e.g., surgical sterilization) or promoted 
(e.g., prenatal genetic diagnosis and in vitro fertilization).   
One might argue that there is nothing dehumanizing about the detection of eugenic 
traits per se, and even about the uses of science and technology to implement eugenic social 
policies.  Following the pathway explored by proponents of utopian, liberal, or moderate 
eugenics, the idea here is that even if there have been particular implementations of eugenics 
during its short history that have dehumanized some people, eugenics is essentially a 
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meliorative project, one that aims to use science and technology to make human lives better 
over generational time (see also Glover 2004, Cavaliere 2018; Wilson and St. Pierre 2016; 
Wilson 2019).  With recognition of the limits to state-level policies in the regulation of 
reproductive rights, and assuming respect for the rights of individuals to determine the 
character of their own life trajectories, eugenics itself need be no more dehumanizing than 
other forms of preventative health care, bioenhancement, and the technological enabling of 
individual human flourishing.  It is this line of thinking, which is (to me at least, surprisingly) 
prevalent amongst bioethicists and other applied ethicists, that underlies Selgelid’s gesture 
towards the possibility of a “better future eugenics”, as well as the application of the idea of 
procreative beneficence to avoid creating children with disabilities (Barker and Wilson 2019). 
 
4.  The Epistemic Importance of Standpoint  
The historical research that has been done on eugenics and ongoing philosophical reflection 
on the nature and significance of eugenics are often sensitive, however, to the possibility that 
eugenics may arise in new forms that are problematic.  Yet despite that sensitivity, very little 
of that historical research and philosophical reflection has drawn directly on the voices and 
perspectives of those who have lived through a eugenic past.  When one is focused on the 
short history of eugenics, ending in 1945, this is understandable.  This is both because of the 
distance in time and because of the radically eliminativist outcomes that the implementation 
of eugenic ideas promoted: murder, euthanasia, and genocide.  Despite the respectable place 
that oral history has established for itself as an epistemic resource over the past 40 years, it 
has only recently been drawn on in understanding eugenics beyond its short history via the 
testimony of sterilization survivors from North Carolina in the United States (Begos et al. 
2012) and Alberta in Canada (Muir 2014; EugenicsArchives.ca).  The voices and narratives of 
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eugenics survivors are important to understanding the dehumanizing effects of eugenics as it 
was practiced beyond those manifest in the extremes of Nazism, for at least three reasons.   
First and most straightforwardly, the details provided in audio and video narratives 
have identified numerous ways in which those who became targets of eugenics were 
dehumanized beyond the important fact that they were institutionalized and sterilized, often 
wrongfully.  Those details range across the confinements and regimentation of everyday 
institutionalized life and include reflections on both ignorance about and the belated 
discovery of sterilizations having been performed on oneself, as well as the downstream 
sequelae of having been (often wrongfully) classified as “low-grade morons” or “incapable of 
intelligent parenthood”.  For example, children at the Provincial Training School in Red Deer, 
Alberta, were subject to psychotropic medical experimentation, were typically deceived 
about the nature of the surgeries that were performed on them, and were subject to extreme 
physical punishment and extended periods of isolation in what was called “the side room” 
(Fairbrother 2014a; Fairbrother 2014b).  As their stories reveal, in their post-institutional 
lives—which for most eugenics survivors in Alberta has been the majority of their lifetimes—
they have faced limited employment opportunities and been denied lives even as adoptive 
parents.  This is due to their having been targets of eugenics in the diagnostic labels applied 
to them, the quality of the education they received, and the fact that they had been 
institutionalized and sterilized.  Thus, what we might call a standpoint eugenics—eugenics 
from the perspective of those most directly marginalized by the associated ideas and 
practices—is a rich source of content about the forms that dehumanization has actually taken 
for people classified so as to become targets of eugenics (Dyck 2013; Wilson 2018c). 
Second, the process of narrative formation itself and its role in constructing shared 
experiences and community serve to rehumanize the subjective experience of individual 
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survivors.  It does so not only by linking survivors together to form kinship-like communities 
that they were denied through their institutionalization, segregation, and sterilization, but 
also by showing the value of the content of what is narrated to audiences of students and 
other local community members.  This effectively creates a receptive audience for the stories 
told, drawing attention to how those perspectives have seldom been sought out or heard.  
The typical absence of the voices and perspectives of those with intellectual disabilities in 
particular is in part a function of the dehumanized status that they have been accorded in the 
larger community.  By making their oral histories a centrepiece of the collective memory of 
eugenic history that is constructed, the subhumanizing tendency of silence or hearer 
negligence is at least partly countered (Wilson 2015). 
Third, the narratives of eugenics survivors have found particular resonance with 
people living with disabilities.  This is especially true around issues of parenting with disability, 
the uses of reproductive technologies that invite the option to selective abort foetuses 
flagged as having some designated genetic condition—the best-known case being that of 
Trisomy 21 and Down Syndrome—and the eugenic logic behind views that assume it would 
be better to eliminate disability in the individual early on than to accommodate to the lived 
reality of life with disability later.  The identification of people living with disability now with 
the shared experiences of those subject to eugenic sterilization more than 50 years earlier 
has been instrumental in motivating a broadening of the concept of eugenic survivorship to 
include some who are several generations younger than the youngest survivors of eugenic 
sterilization programs that ended only in the 1970s. This in turn provides a motivating context 
in which people living with disability today, particularly those parenting with disability in one 
way or another, can locate their own narratives, understand their own life histories, and form 
a sense of community that they likely otherwise would lack. 
12 
 
 
5.  Disability, Reproductive Technologies, and Newgenic Traits  
A focal point for discussions of the continuing effects of a eugenic past on contemporary 
society has been the relationships between reproductive technologies and disability (Parens 
and Asch 2000; Ladd-Taylor 2014; Wilson 2017).  Given that disability, especially intellectual 
disability, has functioned as a strongly negative eugenic trait in the past, people with 
disabilities tend to view the reconsideration of eugenics as a neutral or endorsement-worthy 
project with scepticism.  While reproductive technologies—including contraception, prenatal 
screening, and in vitro fertilization—are generally viewed by able-bodied citizens and in public 
discourse as increasing parental autonomy and are portrayed within medical contexts as 
health-conducive, such optimism is often viewed within the disability community as naïve and 
ignorant about the realities of the eugenic past.  In addition, for those with the traits that are 
seen as important to prevent the occurrence of in future generations—for example, Down 
Syndrome, spina bifida, blindness—the enthusiasm for the view that such technologies 
provide for the means of human improvement is often itself taken to be problematic. 
The best-known of the claims made from the standpoint of those with the very traits 
that are targeted in prenatal screening is often called the expressivist objection: the claim that 
the practice of prenatal screening with selective abortion expresses a strongly negative view 
of people with those traits, a view sufficiently strongly negative to be dehumanizing (Asch 
2000; Parens and Asch 1999; Saxton 1997, 2000) .  This general claim rests on three others, 
beginning with a claim about the function of prenatal testing, that we can view as premises 
in an argument for the expressivist objection: 
1. The practice of prenatal testing functions chiefly to detect foetuses that have a 
biological profile predictive of postnatal impairment. 
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2. The general expectation (but not requirement) in individual instances of this 
practice is that a foetus with such a profile will be terminated, rather than carried 
to term. 
3. That expectation implies the judgment that such a foetus is not worth carrying to 
term to become, in turn, a baby, infant, child, then adult with that impairment. 
Although one might challenge any one of these claims, it is typically the inference from these 
to the expressivist conclusion—a conclusion not about the foetus terminated but more 
generally about people with these negatively valued traits—that has been challenged.  For 
example, Bonnie Steinbock  says that “From the fact that a couple wants to avoid the birth of 
a child with a disability, it just does not follow that they value less the lives of existing people 
with disabilities, any more than taking folic acid to avoid spina bifida indicates a devaluing of 
the lives of people with spina bifida” (Steinbock 2000: 121).  What these claims about a 
practice that, in effect, aims to prevent the birth of a child with a given impairment indicate, 
one might think, is simply that the corresponding trait is not value neutral but negative.  And 
that is something that is both true and not dehumanizing of those with the trait.   
Although Steinbock’s example of taking folic acid is developed in terms of the 
decisions of individuals, rather than in terms of an overall societal practice, it is worth probing 
at whether there is something dehumanizing of those with the trait that lies in the practice 
described by 1-3 that is not present in other societal practices that aim to avoid or prevent 
the very same traits from appearing in future generations.  One relevant difference that 
perhaps allows us to understand the attribution of dehumanization is that 1-3 describe a 
practice of termination of an otherwise desired pregnancy, whereas the general practice of 
taking, recommending, or even prescribing folic acid does not.  The first expresses a view of 
the trait that is so negatively valued that its presence provides a sufficient reason to terminate 
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a process that would otherwise produce an child with that trait; the second only the view that 
it would be better, other things being equal, for that individual not to have that trait.  That 
expression needs to be understood, against the historical reality of the devaluation of the 
lives of people with disabilities.  As Asch has said, 
For people with disabilities to work each day against the societally imposed hardships 
can be exhausting; learning that the world one lives in considers it better to ‘solve’ 
problems of disability by prenatal detection and abortion, rather than by expending 
those resources in improving society so that everyone—including those people who 
have disabilities—could participate more easily, is demoralizing.  It invalidates the 
effort to lead a life in an inhospitable world (Asch 2000: 240). 
The demoralization here is directly connected to the perception of dehumanization: traits 
such as Down syndrome, spina bifida, or blindness, unlike other less desired traits (such as 
having an elevated risk of high blood pressure or being hemaphilic) are sufficiently devalued 
that the individuals with them are better prevented from coming into existence than 
accommodated with the challenges they will face as people with those disabilities.   
Like the eugenic traits of the past, such newgenic traits serve to identify individuals 
whose lives are not viewed as being as valuable as those without such traits.  It is that 
connection to shared practices of non-inclusion or even outright elimination that makes the 
contemporary uses of reproductive technologies a site for a form of dehumanization of 
people with a variety of disabilities, one perceived to be continuous with the eugenic past.  
More generally, contemporary technologies that are deployed to prevent or eliminate 
disabilities in future generations raise more than the spectre of eugenic dehumanization from 
the standpoint of those with those and kindred disabilities.   
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6.  How Marked Human Variation Dehumanizes   
In section 3 I suggested that the mere designation and detection of eugenic traits itself, based 
as it is on the idea that people have differential levels of reproductive value, might be thought 
of as dehumanizing.  I concluded that section, however, by returning to the countering 
thought that eugenics itself is essentially meliorative, contrasting in this respect with 
particular dehumanizing implementations of the core idea of eugenics.  In sections 4 and 5 I 
explained why the standpoints of eugenics survivors and of those who strongly identify with 
those standpoints make that countering thought an uneasy one to maintain.  In this section I 
probe further into the relationship between eugenics and disability in order to advance this 
dialectic. 
In Enforcing Normalcy, the disability theorist Leonard Davis argued that eugenics 
served as a crucible for the social construction of disability in the late nineteenth-century 
(Davis 1995).  While Davis’s claim has been rightly influential, the resulting constructivist view 
of disability provides only a limited answer to what I have called the puzzle of marked 
variation (Wilson 2018a: ch.5).  That puzzle raises questions in part about how we think about 
human variation, and addressing it allows for further reflection on the relationship between 
eugenics, disability, and dehumanization.  
The puzzle is this: why is it that, amongst the infinite range of variation we find within 
human populations, we view some of it as mere variation—variation that hardly draws our 
attention—and some of it as marked variation, where marked variation becomes the basis for 
positive and negative evaluations, together with corresponding forms of social expression, 
such as laws, policies, and practices.  In the context of eugenics, marked variation appears as 
eugenic traits, and so the puzzle of marked variation in the context of eugenics is to explain 
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why we distinguish between eugenic traits and mere human variation, in the ways in which 
we do.   
The general answer that I have argued for to the puzzle of marked variation blends 
together psychological and social dimensions to our perceptions of and responses to marked 
variation.  We are socio-cognitive beasts, with psychological tendencies to distinguish 
between those who are like us and those who are unlike us.  Those dispositions operate on 
highly value-laden categorizations of other people and their content is sensitive to specific 
social and scientific contexts.  With the rise of eugenic thinking and its link to putatively 
meliorative practices in the late nineteenth century, those not-like-us came to be viewed as 
subnormal, particularly as intellectually and emotionally subnormal.  This is a form of 
cognitively-mediated normativity that marks off disability in terms of subnormalcy.  It is 
created, reinforced, and transmitted through individual, extended, and group-level cognition. 
Many of the values that laden the constitutive categorizations of people in eugenic 
thinking are dehumanizing, some essentially so.  To negatively value a eugenic trait 
sufficiently to justify the bodily intervention of compulsory sexual sterilization is to 
dehumanize those with that trait.  Proponents of the expressivist objection would say that 
the same is true of traits such as Down Syndrome, since results from screening and diagnostic 
tests that elevate the chance of one’s fetus having Down Syndrome are sufficient for the vast 
majority of pregnant women (or couples) to terminate an otherwise desirable pregnancy.  In 
the first case it is the person sterilized who is treated as less than fully human; in the second 
case, it is people with Down Syndrome more generally.  In both cases, a process beginning 
with the detection of marked variation in our species ends with the dehumanization of 
individuals or putative sorts of people with disabilities.  If the psychological tendencies in play 
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here run deep in human nature, as I think they do, this may suggest to some a pessimistic 
conclusion about our capacity to counter or even resist these forms of dehumanization. 
One might well object to this pessimism as overstating or oversimplifying the 
relationship between marked variation (and so disability) and dehumanization.  Cognitively-
mediated normativity that operates through “like us” detectors may well be a part of our 
species psychological profile, but the values on which it does so are themselves a function of 
historical contingencies that are subject to change.  To illustrate, consider the cases of race 
or gender.   
Both race and gender may well serve as inputs to the same kind of “like us” detection 
mechanisms, and the response to those determined not to be like us may be differential 
(Kendig 2018).  But it doesn’t follow that such detection and response to these kinds of 
marked variation are themselves dehumanizing.  The detection of race and gender can be—
indeed, have been in relatively recent history—socially scaffolded in positive ways.  We have 
come to see these as neutral traits across many contexts in which they are detected, including 
contexts of employment, of democratic participation, and of community leadership.  And in 
other contexts, such as athleticism or care, we have come to valorize those who, in the past, 
had been negatively valued in virtue of not being “like us”.  Disability should be no different 
here.   
Whether or not disability should be viewed together with race and gender here, those 
cases are indeed instructive for understanding disability as marked variation that 
dehumanizes.  For while there have been changes to the values underlying the perception of 
gendered and racialized differences that constitute advances and counters to some forms of 
devaluation, those changes are significantly more pronounced as ideals than as variables that 
govern our day-to-day perception and response of those differences.  The cognitively-
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mediated normativity that operates on racialized and gendered differences need not be 
dehumanizing, but as a matter of fact it often is, not just historically but in contemporary 
society.   
When we turn to disability, the contrast here is even more striking, especially when 
we consider the positive valuing of what have been eugenic traits.  It is logically possible that 
the detection of disability as a form of marked variation goes hand-in-hand with valorization, 
rather than devaluation.  For example, celebration, rather that approbation and fear, might 
accompany the discovery during pregnancy that one’s foetus had screened positively for 
Trisomy 21 and so one’s child was likely to have Down Syndrome.  Or a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia in one’s teenage son might bring smiles and sighs of relief.  But very much like 
racialized and gendered differences, the actual ways in which such cognitively-mediated 
normativity operates in fact creates pathways of dehumanization.  Racism, sexism, and 
ableism are all very much real features of our social worlds.  Even if we can conceptualize the 
relevant psychological mechanisms here as value neutral, they very much operate on and 
reinforce the effects of, dehumanizing evaluations of people who are not “like us”.  For this 
reason, the distinction between, if you like, eugenic theory and the practice or 
implementation of that theory is not sufficiently robust to make on optimistic about the 
prospects for Selgelid’s “better future eugenics”. 
 
7.  Understanding the Persistence of Eugenic Dehumanization  
One might well have misgivings about whether it is ultimately defensible to view practices 
like prenatal screening with selective termination (section 5) or the kind of cognitively-
mediated normativity that I have postulated as underlying eugenic thinking (section 6) as 
themselves dehumanizing for those who have been targets of eugenics or newgenics.  By 
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contrast, eugenic sterilization, particularly involuntary eugenic sterilization, is a paradigm of 
a practice that is widely accepted as dehumanizing (Myerson et al. 1936; Reilly 2015).  This is 
not simply because of its bodily invasiveness but because of the negative changes that it 
brings to one’s overall life trajectory.  One thing that stands in need of explanation is the 
persistence of this form of eugenic dehumanization beyond 1950, well after the atrocities of 
Nazi eugenics became well-known, and even as reproductive rights have come to gain wider 
acceptance as basic rights to which all individuals are entitled.  As recounted in section 2, in 
Alberta eugenic sterilization persisted until the 1970s, as it did in the Scandinavian countries 
and in a small number of American states.   
Moreover, in more recent years a number of cases of sterilization with eugenic 
undertones have emerged (Women With Disabilities Australia 2013).  This includes the 
sterilization of girls and women with intellectual disabilities in Australia in 2012, of African-
American and Latina women in the Californian prison system in 2013, and of low-caste 
women in the province of Chhattisgarh in India, a long-standing practice of paid sterilization 
brought to the wider public eye in 2014 after about twenty of them died following their 
careless sterilization Wilson 2018b).  What is it that explains the staying power of this form of 
eugenic dehumanization, particularly given its recognition as a core practice in the dark past 
of eugenics? 
An appeal to eugenics per se as an endorsable meliorative project seems particularly 
ill-suited to develop an answer to this question.  More generally, the common tendency to 
search for an explanation here in terms of the positive attraction of powerful ideas should be 
resisted.  Instead, one should move from the realm of ideas to explore the social mechanics 
governing eugenic practices themselves to explain eugenic sterilization’s staying power. 
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I have suggested elsewhere (Wilson 2018a: ch.8) that the first step here is to recognize 
at least some eugenic sterilization as manifesting wrongful accusation, accusation that 
doesn’t simply happen to get some details wrong about a particular case but that manifests 
a systematic set of errors that make mistaken categorization, institutionalization, and 
sterilization robustly supported outcomes.  That was certainly the case in Alberta.  But this 
idea of eugenics as wrongful accusation itself derives from taking the standpoint of eugenics 
survivors seriously, since it was an idea suggested, in nascent form, by one such survivor from 
Alberta, Ken Nelson (Whiting 1996). 
The robustness here stems, in part, from the social dynamics governing what is 
sometimes called witnessing, whereby bystanders or “witnesses” are called on to side with 
either perpetrator or victim.  The psychiatrist Judith Herman has developed a rich, three-
agent model of the perpetration of, and resistance to, sexual crimes, particularly in her 
influential Trauma and Recovery.  I have argued that this model can be adapted (no doubt in 
ways that Herman herself would reject) to understand the social mechanics of eugenics as a 
form of wrongful accusation, and so the persistence of dehumanizing eugenic practices, such 
as sexual sterilization.   
  The key here is to return to the distinction between what we might call eugenic 
ideology or the eugenic ideal, on the one hand, and how eugenics was implemented in at 
least some practices of sexual sterilization, on the other.  In eugenic ideology, we can think of 
those with eugenic traits as perpetrators of a eugenic crime, the victims of which are normal 
citizens, and the bystanders or witnesses to which are advocates, such as community and 
political leaders.  Given that conceptualization, then what we see in cases of eugenics in 
practice in cases of wrongful accusation is an occupant-role shift, as depicted in Table 1 below, 
letting “the feebleminded” stand in for those with eugenic traits more generally: 
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Role:occupant in eugenic ideology 
 
 
Occupant-role shift in eugenics in practice 
 
perpetrator: the feebleminded 
 
 
the feebleminded become victims 
 
victim: the normal 
 
 
the normal become bystanders 
 
bystander: ally or advocate 
 
 
advocates become perpetrators 
 
Table 1: From Eugenic Ideology to Eugenics in Practice 
 
Here the activity of eugenic allies or advocates in becoming perpetrators looms large in the 
psychosocial dynamics in play.  Called to act on behalf of the normal, allies or advocates come 
to play crucial causal roles in making those deemed “feebleminded” and ascribed other 
eugenic traits into victims of a kind of eugenics crusade.  Those roles direct the persistence of 
dehumanizing eugenic practices.  
That persistence is typically conceptualized in terms of the resurgence of appealing 
eugenic ideas and ideals: of unfettered social improvement, of the excise of disease and 
disability, of increasing human perfection.  Insofar as such ideas play a role in the persistence 
of dehumanizing eugenic practices, however, they do so in part through the psychosocial 
dynamics expressed in this three-agent model featuring perpetrator, victim, and bystander.  I 
have hypothesized that the corruption of the bystander or witnessing role is especially 
powerful in driving this dynamic in the history of eugenics and its continuation in 
contemporary forms.  If this is correct, then it identifies a dimension to the persistence of 
22 
 
eugenic dehumanization that involves the complicity in such dehumanization of “good 
citizens”, those who see themselves as acting for the promotion of the social good. 
 
8.  Larger Questions about Dehumanization   
If this account of the psychosocial dynamics of eugenic dehumanization is on track, larger 
questions about eugenic dehumanization loom.  Can the perceived eugenic threat of 
degeneracy and the degradation of the gene pool justify policies regarding institutionalization 
and sterilization at all?  Should the systematic wrongfulness that results when eugenics moves 
from theory to practice be viewed as an unfortunate but on balance necessary evil for the 
protection of society?  Are there any people who are legitimate targets of eugenic practices? 
These are not simply abstract questions to be thrown around in some history, 
philosophy, or bioethics seminar.  Eugenic dehumanization persists not simply as a set of ideas 
or utopian ideals but in technologically-mediated practices.  Collectively those practices 
continue to affect many individual lives today.  With expansions in the reach of genetic and 
reproductive technologies to direct intergenerational change, addressing these questions will 
take on even more importance for decisions about what sorts of people populate our future. 
Answers to these large questions are hard, and they are not settled by anything I have 
said here.  But recognizing the fundamental persistence of eugenic dehumanization in 
practice and understanding the psychosocial dynamics that gives that dehumanization its 
staying power are both constraints on how we should answer them. 
Finally, since eugenics is just one specific cluster of ideas that governs how we 
collectively respond to human variation and difference, one centred around the 
intergenerational improvement of the putative quality of future populations, the psychosocial 
mechanisms that operate in eugenic dehumanization that I have specified likely operate 
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beyond the realm of eugenics (Kendig 2018).  Consider, for example, much-discussed, recent 
US policing practices resulting in the deaths of African-American citizens who not only had 
committed no relevant crime but had little objective basis even to be detained or questioned 
by police.  Important work on implicit bias and dehumanization by Jennifer Eberhardt and 
colleagues has been applied both to understand and to meliorate this form of dehumanization 
(Eberhardt et al. 2004; Eberhardt et al. 2006; Goff et al. 2008).  In addition to however we 
understand the input representations (e.g., stereotypes) and the in-the-head processing (e.g., 
implicit associations) operant here are the processes and mechanisms that govern the 
interpersonal dynamics in play that all too often have resulted in the killing of an innocent 
person.   Attending to the occupant-role shift that characterizes the dynamics of witnessing 
in cases of wrongful accusation may shed complementary light on how such policing practices 
persist and what else might be adopted as an interventional strategy of melioration. 
 
Related Topics 
Early modern invention of humanity 
The dehumanization of humanity and critiques of biological determinism 
Dehumanization in post-WWII social sciences 
Dehumanization in legal thinking 
Essentialism and dehumanization 
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